Introductory Essay

The Body and Soul of Integration by Maguire, Mark & Titley, Gavan
 1 
Translocations: Migration and Social Change 
An Inter-Disciplinary Open Access E-Journal  
ISSN Number: 2009-0420  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Introductory Essay 
The Body and Soul of Integration 
Mark Maguire and Gavan Titley  
Department of Anthropology, Maynooth, Email: Mark.H.Maguire@nuim.ie  
Centre for Media Studies, NUI Maynooth, Email: gavan.titley@nuim.ie 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
If managed well, immigration is one area where our citizens will clearly see 
the added value of a European approach. Such an approach should help the EU 
to address, and to a certain extend reduce, unwanted phenomena such as 
unregulated migration and trafficking in human beings, while ensuring that 
Europe can welcome the migrants its economy needs and its society is capable 
and willing to receive.  
 
– Franco Frattini, European Minister for Justice, Freedom and Security, 2007 
 
1. Ever closer assemblage? The politics of Integration in Europe 
The term integration, as applied to immigration and often fraught questions of social 
cohesion in Europe, does not have a long history. Specialists on European policy have 
dated the use of ‘integration’ to the 1974 Commission Action Plan in Favour of 
Migrant Workers and their Families. The Action Plan was composed of a set of 
proposals to improve basic living and working conditions but did not challenge the 
rights of Member States to manage their own social cohesion agendas. Later, the 1977 
Council Directive on Education of the Children of Migrant Workers sought to place 
responsibility on Member States for the free education of children of migrant workers 
in host language(s), their mother tongue and native ‘culture,’ and for the training of 
special teachers in this area. Several Member States, including Ireland, simply ignored 
this directive.1 However, following the first Schengen border control agreement in 
1985 integration took on a more tangible form. Initially, Schengen secured the free 
movement of residents of France, Germany and the Benelux Economic Union across 
internal borders, but the vanishing of those internal borders was predicated by the 
securitization of the Schengen area’s external borders. A variety of commentators 
argue that it is at this moment that we can observe the birth of ‘Fortress Europe’; the 
progressive securitization of immigration, and the moment in which migration and 
integration become specific problematizations of security (see Bigo 1994; Huysmans 
2006).  
  
These early moments were ones during which the sovereign power of Member States 
was at stake, and in 1985 the extent to which Brussels had the power to regulate the 
migration policies of Member States was challenged and effectively curtailed in a 
European Court of Justice ruling. But the genie was out of the bottle. First in the 
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 Children with barely a few words of English were being put in classrooms with no special provision 
and asked to ‘sink or swim’.  They would have to acquire another language by osmosis and along the 
way some were expected to pick up a few words as Gaeilge (see Maguire 2004). 
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Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and then in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam integration 
policy became a European issue by virtue of the fact that migration and border control 
must now be framed at that level. The intention of the Treaty of Amsterdam was to 
strengthen economic and social cohesion, establish a common foreign and security 
policy and, ‘an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of 
persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external 
border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime’ 
(EU 1997: 5).2 Of course, Ireland and the United Kingdom do not fully participate in 
the Schengen Agreement and they therefore represent somewhat different trajectories 
within the broader history of EU policies. Since 1923, the UK and Ireland share a 
Common Travel Area (CTA) and their migration policies move in lock-step (see Ryan 
2001). This synchronicity has been shown time and again. For example, the British 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1962 was followed by the Irish Aliens (Amendment) 
Order, 1962, and, more recently, when in 1999 the UK requested an opt-in for the 
policing and judicial cooperation aspects of the Schengen acquis, or body of law, 
Ireland made a corresponding request in 2000. This type of case-by-case optionality is 
provided for in the Treaty of Amsterdam. However, the long-term persistence of the 
CTA is unlikely and it is therefore important to further consider the deepening 
connections between security, immigration and integration at EU level. 
 
When one looks back over developments in the 1980s and 1990s one can see the 
progressive instantiation of systems, institutions and policies that clearly hold 
migration, integration and security together. During the Tampere Council in 1999 
there was a general concern to articulate a EU-wide policy on integration, though the 
tension between the rights of Member States vis-à-vis migration policy and the 
emergent trend towards ‘uploading’ to the EU was still evident. Despite these tensions, 
during the years following Tampere a broad framework began to emerge, especially 
through the EU Commission (see European Commission 2000). This framework 
explicitly brought together the areas of immigration and social cohesion. While the 
link with security was not in direct focus it nonetheless remained a powerful 
presence.3 However, following the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 it was 
security that took centre stage. From that point onwards, migration (understood to 
share a field with crime and terrorism) and integration (understood to share a field 
with cohesion, ‘basic values’, inviolable rights and national laws) were to be framed 
more and more as matters of security.  
  
The 2004 Hague Program saw the EU twenty five set out an ambitious plan to 
strengthen fundamental rights and protect refugees, but it was also a plan that 
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 A Treaty of Amsterdam protocol brought the Schengen Agreement into the EU framework, and the 
Schengen acquis, or body of law, is now in the legal and institutional framework of the EU. This 
provides for, inter alia, police, surveillance, judicial cooperation and the Schengen Information System 
(SIS). 
3 Under a section titled, ‘Management of migration flows’ the Tampere Council conclusions included a 
focus on illegal migration and calls for cooperation with countries of origin and transit. Indeed, the 
degree to which migration is criminalized, or, perhaps more appropriately, securitized, is striking. The 
Council, for example, welcomed the maritime surveillance and capture agreement between Italy and 
Greece as a great step towards cooperation in combating ‘organised crime, smuggling and trafficking 
of persons’ (Tampere 1999). But the most salient aspect of this section is the call for further and deeper 
harmonization of security in terms of systems, technologies, institutions and documentation. 
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packaged international crime and terrorism together with international migration.4 
Indeed, understanding the eleven ‘Common Basic Principles’ for integration set out at 
the first EU Ministerial Conference on Integration in 2004 may be enhanced by 
simply attending to the language used: the Justice and Home Affairs press release 
begins by discussing ‘the effective management of migration’ (European Council 
2004 [our emphasis]). Whilst the common principles ostensibly aim to balance 
tolerance of diversity and cohesion in Europe, tolerance, as Wendy Brown writes, is a 
‘productive force – one that fashions, regulates, and positions subjects, citizens and 
states as well as one that legitimates certain kinds of actions’ (2006: 10). Thus this 
balancing act reveals a fallacious underpinning: because cohesion denotes ‘basic 
values’, inviolable rights and national laws it cannot be balanced with anything; rather, 
cohesion ‘sets the boundaries’ for tolerance. Moreover, it is unwise to take these 
principles and their boundaries in isolation. For example, the 2007 EU Commission 
communication on Member States’ integration policies stresses the ‘complementary 
linkage’ between integration and immigration (European Council 2007: 23).  
 
Furthermore, integration in the 2007 communication is but a single dimension in a 
broader agenda that provides powerful insights into the emerging European security 
field. The communication describes activities at a number of scales and indexes the 
extant linkages between Member States in cross-border policing, such as the 
automated transfer of DNA profiles, dactyloscopic data, and vehicle registration data. 
The communication also describes the ongoing development of the Visa Information 
System (VIS) behind which is the European database of alphanumeric and biometric 
data – and, illustratively framed, ‘the VIS will allow a major advance in protecting 
against international terrorism and organised crime in particular’ (European Council 
2007: 15). As Guild, Groenendijk and Carrera (2009) have recently illustrated, a 
securitized modality of integration now extends from such technologies as the 
privatised ‘pre-migration’ integration test pioneered by the Netherlands to 
increasingly complex and gradiated stratifications of residence and entitlement. 
Integration is now more likely to function as a multi-layered strategy of population 
governance than as a stage in providing access to national citizenship through 
naturalisation. Integration, in other words, must be understood as a border practice, 
beyond and inside the territorial border:  
 
In the context of immigration law, integration becomes a tool to control the 
non-national ‘inside’ the nation-state and even ‘abroad’... Integration functions 
as another regulatory technique for the state to manage access by the non-
national – not to the status of citizen – but to the act of entry, the security of 
residence, family reunification and protection against expulsion... Integration 
determines the ‘legality’ or ‘illegality’ of human mobility, and constitutes 
another frontier to being considered as a ‘legal immigrant’ (2009: 16) 
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 In a revealing paragraph of a 2005 Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on the 
priorities in migration management, external security and integration are treated as separate but related 
arenas of emerging policy and EU infrastructure: ‘The Hague Programme […] provides an ambitious 
set of measures and commitments [including] the establishment of the European Agency for the 
management of operational cooperation at the External Borders (FRONTEX) [; furthermore] the 
Commission adopted a package of initiatives that deal with various important dimensions of migration, 
including integration, the linkages between migration and development and return. (Commission 2005: 
621, [our annotations]). 
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Thus while integration is frequently presented politically as a processual vision, 
seeking a a balance between diversity and ‘social cohesion’, analytically it must be 
approached through a discussion of those arenas which have a ‘complementary 
linkage’. To study immigration in Europe these days involves research frames that are 
porous well beyond the methodological nationalism of old. Immigration is configured 
in Europe as a complex field with many types of actors, from legal to ‘illegal’, from 
‘high value’ to low skilled to the human waste of Zygmunt Bauman’s haunting 
characterisation (2003). The trajectory of integration governance - extending, in 
theory, from a pricey automated phone test at ‘home’ to years of status-dependent 
tests, regulations and restrictions in the migration location – seeks to sort and manage 
subjects according to intersecting visions of labour market value, personal autonomy, 
cultural compatability, and the socio-economic footprint of familial networks. It 
follows that immigration is also configured as something that does not begin and end 
at the border: from so-called good neighbourhood policies with North African 
countries to new technologies for visa processing, the borders are no longer where the 
map indicates. Muammar Gadafi may have embarrased the EU5 by publicly naming a 
price for intercepting an ‘influx of starving and igorant Africans’ – and in so doing, 
also explicitly echoing what Goldberg (2009) terms the ‘fear of a black planet’ - but it 
is within this field that new security specialists, agencies and ‘experts’ do their work. 
The politics of integration is now less a question of individual nation-states 
controlling migration into their territories and reconciling diversity and cohesion 
therein, but, rather, a broader assemblage composed of different discrete assemblages 
– integration, migration, security, post-racial hierarchies, strategies for growth and 
investment – which are themselves understood as multiple.6  
  
There is nothing especially new or particularly European about this assemblage of 
seemingly heterogeneous elements. Take for example John F. Kennedy’s famous 
1957 speech to the Anti-Defamation League, posthumously published as A Nation of 
Immigrants in 1964. President Kennedy included a 1946 cartoon by Herblock 
depicting Americans debating migration policy and national identity while in the 
background the Statue of Liberty stands with a hand outstretched in refusal, her head 
drawn haughtily back so as to better peer at immigrants through her opera glasses (see 
Kennedy 2008: 12-13, figures). President Kennedy was well aware that while Liberty 
Enlightening the World is inscribed with a welcome to the world’s huddled masses, 
the United States has always been selective as to which masses it admits (see Zolberg 
2006: 2, 24-58). He was especially concerned about the racial politics that obtained 
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 See Gadaffi wants EU cash to stop African migrants’ BBC News online 31 August 2010 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11139345 
6
 We use the suggestive concept of assemblage throughout this introductory essay. The current use of 
the term in critical social theory draws from Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus (2004). Paul 
Patton explains their deployment of the term as an effort to understand the relationships between a, 
‘multiplicity of heterogeneous objects, whose unity comes solely from the fact that these items function 
together, that they “work” together as a functional entity’. Also, ‘any particular assemblage is itself 
composed of different discrete assemblages which are themselves multiple’ (Patton 1994: 158). 
Deleuze and Guattari propose that desire forms a ‘field of immanence’, an always-active and positive 
force. And, whereas the ‘the state’ implies the striation of space (the separation, division and capture of 
flows), an assemblage, in contrast, merely fixes a flow in a temporary fashion. An assemblage is thus 
spatial and temporal. By adopting the term assemblage, here we wish to understand security, migration 
and integration as a part of a multiple, unstable and de-(re)territorialized form. The crucial insight to be 
gained from adopting the term assemblage is that contemporary shifts in integration or security policy 
cannot be challenged by simply attacking one clearly bounded policy domain or ‘the state’ as a fixed 
form. 
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behind the immigration quota system and was mindful of the disjuncture between 
myths of ethnic assimilation (often encapsulated in tropes such as the ‘melting pot’) 
and the lived realities of racism, especially ‘in the case of the Negro’ (Kennedy 2008: 
35). Immigration, security, so-called assimilation, and ideals of upward social 
mobility, needed to be spoken of together – an assemblage composed of different, 
multiple assemblages. 
  
The contemporary ways in which ‘integration’ and security are assembled in North 
America are described by Elaine Dezenski of the US Department of Homeland 
Security. ‘About 100 years ago,’ she tells us, so-called Americanization ‘sought to 
promote civic literacy, English language acquisition, and cultural assimilation’. In 
contrast, today, she tells us, ‘We believe, that, despite differences in background, all 
Americans are bound together by a set of enduring civic principles as relevant today 
as they were the day our Constitution’ (Dezenski 2006: passim). This contemporary 
articulation of diversity and societal cohesion rests not just on a putative abandonment 
of national assimilation in favour of common basic values but also on the 
securitization of migration and the reshaping of borders, border powers and border 
technologies (most recently evidenced in the state of Arizona’s Senate Bill 10707). 
Dezenski’s comments were made in the context of a presentation on the role of new 
security technologies and processes in managing ‘the secure and efficient movement 
of legitimate and low-risk traffic across our shared borders through […] facilitating 
travel, enforcing immigration laws, and identifying the bad guys’ (Dezenski 2006: 
passim). 
 
Jonathan Xavier Inda (2006) writes about the current configuration of the US-Mexico 
border, from the militarized approach adopted during the Clinton-era Operation 
Gatekeeper to the ever-expanding use of surveillance and biometric technologies. 
Inda is concerned to show the linkages between the political mentalities that construct 
the poor, the ‘criminal aliens’ and the ‘natives’ as objects, but he is also concerned to 
unpick the ways in which problematizations emerge alongside actual interventions 
and technologies of governing. It is often at the level of those technical solutions used 
to render populations visible, calculable and knowable that acute insights into the 
contemporary moment can be gained. These seemingly mundane forms of governing 
– bureaucratic rules, statistical data, and frontline technologies such as biometrics – 
are key sites for investigation, the material inscriptions of governing, to borrow a 
label from Bruno Latour (1986). Inda’s conclusion is that we are witnessing the 
violent growth of technologies of citizenship, on one side, which increasingly 
individuate and render as technical linkages with government, and, on the other side, 
anti-citizen technologies that operate at the level of the body and function to keep the 
poor out of the United States. This securitization process has a necessary connection 
to societal debates about integration and citizenship. The ongoing public debates in 
the United States about undocumented immigrants’ rights and new graduated forms of 
citizenship are coterminous with a process of securitization that operates at the 
borders and simultaneously across society. Whereas once migration studies specialists 
could wring their hands over populations who were in America physically but not of 
America in the sense of cultural integration, now there is greater attention to the ways 
in which securitization is creating the gated worlds described by Susan Bibler Coutin: 
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 See Archibold, R. ‘Arizona enacts stringent law on immigration, The New York Times April 23 2010. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig.html 
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Unauthorized migrants are absented physically by being detained or deported, 
and socially by being denied particular rights and services. […] Of course, 
absenting is often partial in that, alongside those who are legally present, 
unauthorized migrants travel, work, take up residence, shop, and so forth. 
There is, therefore, a sense in which the ‘underground,’ occupied by the 
unauthorized, is a dimension of social reality rather than a separate place.  […] 
Legal vulnerability makes unauthorized migrants a source of cheap labour, 
illicit economies grow up around prohibited practices, and countries such as El 
Salvador depend on the remittances that migrant workers send home to family 
members. (Coutin 2005: 196) 
 
In some senses then, in Europe and America and in other parts of the world, a 
complex picture of integration is emerging. This picture shows integration to be a 
term that is imbricated in economic, societal and governmental processes that are both 
broad and deep. The study of integration cannot be framed as something amenable to 
simple ‘common indicators and indexes’ within each nation-state. Rather integration 
is an assemblage that holds together contemporary articulations of the need for ‘core 
values’, social capital, tolerance, and the management of diversity with a border 
assemblage that includes immigration and security. Nor, for all this focus on 
governmentality, is it restricted to the operations of state power. Commenting on the 
increased fusion of integration and economic chauvinism with questions of security, 
Didier Fassin has argued that since 9/11 the menace of immigration has been coded 
more insistently in civilizational terms: ‘Although difficult to name, as it is masked by 
cultural or religious, sometimes ethnic description, it can be characterized more 
bluntly as a racial security: it has to do with the protection of a European, Christian 
and white civilization against Third World, Muslim or black populations’ (2005: xx). 
Crucially, the articulation of inchoate and coded desires for racial security is not the 
preserve of the traditional far-right, nor ‘populist’ political parties. Recent work on 
homonationalism (Puar 2007) and ‘Schmittian liberalism’ (Triadafilopoulos 2011), 
for example, examines the assemblage of anti-migrant politics within civil society 
movements and putatively progressive political rubrics. Of note here, for example, is 
the ‘save our gays’ meme within gay rights advocacy, and the promulgation of 
illiberal means to liberal ends through compulsory integration processes and 
exclusionary migration policies.  
 
By approaching integration as a assemblage, therefore, we can begin to approach 
debates around the world as not merely nation-state models of integration but, rather, 
as particular articulations of a widespread problematization of immigration, security, 
and integration. We turn now to explore how integration is debated in Ireland and aim 
to tease out some of the ways in which it is being framed. 
 
2. Ireland’s two-way process: the violence in the gift 
The term integration, as applied to immigration and social cohesion, has a very short 
history in Ireland. The first truly significant policy publication on this issue is the 
interdepartmental report Integration: a Two-Way Process (2003), which describes, 
 
[…] a two way process that places a real obligation on both society and the 
individual refugee. From the refugee’s perspective, integration requires a 
willingness to adapt to the lifestyle of Irish society without abandoning or 
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being expected to abandon one’s own cultural identity. From the point of view 
of Irish society, it requires a willingness to accept refugees on the basis of 
equality and to take action to facilitate access to services, resources, and 
decision-making processes in parity with Irish nationals […]. 
(Interdepartmental Working Group 2003: 42) 
 
There is no conflation of asylum seeker and refugee here. The policy statement speaks 
of the refugee (read genuine) and not of the asylum seeker because the latter are not 
included in integration policy. Similarly, the more recent Ministerial statement on 
integration, Migration Nation makes only one clear reference to the relationship 
between integration policy and asylum seekers: the need for a more ‘streamlined 
asylum process’ (2008: 9).A variety of commentators have sought to unpack Ireland’s 
policy statements on integration, and it is in part due to the directions and questions 
raised by their work that this special issue has been developed (e.g. Gray 2006; 
Fanning 2007; Boucher 2008). At the risk of being overly generalizing, these 
commentators are in broad agreement that Irish integration policy is a thin laissez-
faire strategy aiming to cultivate and mediate tolerable forms of diversity. At the same 
time, it gathers an index of governmental strategies to stratify and divide migrants in a 
layer-cake model that runs from full exclusion to full citizenship, and that, as Gray 
argues, is interested in a particularly neoliberal form of action on the conduct of 
‘autonomous’ subjects. Speaking of the definition of integration in migration policy, 
Bryan Fanning thus concludes: ‘In essence this definition has two components. The 
first relates to the rights and resources needed to participate fully in society. The 
second concerns forms of racism which justify discrimination and inequality’ (2007: 
248; see also Boucher 2008). Here Fanning is noting the Janus-faced approach 
apparent in integration policy and drawing attention to the realities of racism, all too 
often muted in public discussions. Ronit Lentin and Robbie McVeigh cast the 
situation in forceful terms: 
 
Amid all our celebrations of diversity and integration and multiracialism and 
multiculturalism and interculturalism, Irish racism has intensified 
exponentially. […] Increasingly, both multiculturalism and interculturalism 
are abandoned as ‘integration’ becomes the watchword for managing racism in 
the 21st century. The problem of racism is both displaced and denied – now the 
real problem is located within the qualities of those minorities that need to be 
‘integrated’. […] Anyway, who could argue against the principle of 
‘integration’? (2006: 165-166) 
 
Lentin and McVeigh’s critique of racialization as a process that connects the 
gatedness of the state to its internal ‘integration’ agenda is important, and herein our 
aim is to tease out these connections and consider them in a ways that attends to the 
key role of racialization while also examining other processes. We note, for example, 
that the connections between security, immigration and integration are openly spoken 
of in political discourse. Following Boucher (2008), it is worth recalling the address 
made by former Tánaiste and former Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, 
Michael McDowell, TD, at the 2007 conference, Integration Policy – strategies for a 
cohesive society where he acknowledged, ‘[T]he critical links between the 
immigration, visa, asylum and integration areas,’ with the result that changes ‘to our 
immigration laws are changes to the integration landscape’ (2007: no pagination). His 
statements on ‘integration management’ may at first glance appear thin and sweeping, 
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but once again it is the complementary linkages, the assemblage of different elements, 
that we must attend to. And these linkages are often forcefully noted by government 
officials: responding to a question on integration posed by an Irish Times journalist, 
one exasperated official remarked, ‘Integration can’t happen without deportation!’ 
(MacCormaic 2009). We are arguing here for the importance of attending to an 
assemblage that includes securitization, immigration and integration, and for an 
exploration of modes of racialization that, following Fassin, draw on a repertoire of 
intersections between culture, religion, ‘race’, region, class, ‘contribution’, poverty 
and ‘compatibility’. It therefore follows that while specific integration policies require 
critical engagement, an adequate research frame must also treat policy and legislation 
on security and immigration as sites in which integration emerges.  
 
The most recent site of this kind is the current legislation on immigration and 
residency. The Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill, 2008, first appeared as an 
attempt to clarify and support of the Government of Ireland’s capacity to regulate the 
presence, movement and deportation of foreign nationals. However, yet again, it 
recalls the synchronicity of the UK and Ireland required by participation in the 
Common Travel Area, specifically with the UK Border, Citizenship and Immigration 
Act, 2009. Both instruments were intended to progress away from the CTA towards 
greater harmonization with the Schengen acquis. The UK always insisted on the 
maintenance of the CTA as a means by which to retain control over its borders, 
however, the extraordinary pace of Schengen securitization and the exponential 
growth of new technologies have rendered EU competence in this area much more 
palatable to the British state. In the Republic, the first iteration of the immigration and 
residency legislation was poorly framed and subject to hundreds of amendments. In 
particular, NGOs working with migrants expressed alarm over the failure to set out 
clear rules regarding the rights and obligations of people migrating to Ireland. This 
lack of clarity, many advocacy groups contended, gave extraordinary power to the 
offices of the Minister for Justice, and much regulation would likely be in the form of 
statutory instruments beyond full public scrutiny. Others worried about Section 108 of 
the Bill, which set out provisions for biometric data. The proposed legislation 
compelled foreign nationals to provide such data to an immigration officer or the 
police and it was to be an offence to refuse. Biometric security was also to involve the 
development of a register of foreign nationals in line with broader EU systems.  The 
concerns expressed by NGOs included lack of public debate and reservations about 
issues of privacy and methods of data collecting. The then Minister for Justice, Brian 
Lenihan explained: 
 
The business of managing migration to the State is about making choices. It 
cannot be the case that we say to everyone who wants to migrate here: “Come on 
in.” I owe a duty to Irish society […] to continue to ensure to the greatest extent 
possible that Ireland is a safe place to live, with an economy that continues to 
thrive, and that it is not used as a base for criminality. In the immigration context, 
I fulfil that duty by making choices about which foreign nationals can come in, 
which ones can stay and, ultimately, which ones must leave. (Lenihan 2008: no 
pagination) 
 
Here, the former Minister performs a one-man version of Roi Soleil, a speech-act 
event that produces ‘the state’ personified as the speaker: L’État c’est Moi!’ (see 
Buzan and Wæver 2003; cf. Butler 1997). And, when the Bill reappeared in 2010 the 
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same performance was re-enacted by his successor. According to Minister Dermot 
Ahern, ‘the State has not only the power (a power exercised mainly by the Minister 
for Justice and Law Reform) to manage the entry into, presence in and removal from 
the State of non-nationals, but has a duty to do so in protection of the interests of Irish 
society and, indeed, the integrity of the State’s immigration processes’ (Ahern 2010: 
no pagination). Both Ministers’ scripts refer directly or indirectly to the 
jurisprudential authority of a 1986 Supreme Court ruling: 
 
[I]t is in the interests of the common good of a State that it should have control 
of the entry of aliens, their departure and their activities and duration of stay 
within the State is and has been recognised universally and from earliest times. 
There are fundamental rights of the State itself as well as fundamental rights 
of the individual citizen, and the protection of the former may involve 
restrictions in circumstances of necessity on the latter. The integrity of the 
State constituted as it is for the collective body of its citizens within the 
national territory must be defended and vindicated by the organs of the State 
and by the citizens so that there may be true social order within the territory 
and concord maintained with other nations in accordance with the objectives 
declared in the preamble to the Constitution. (Osheku v. Ireland, 1986, I.R. 
733, 746) 
 
Famously, this Supreme Court ruling was upheld and extended in Bode Bode (A 
Minor) -v- Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform & Ors (2007) with the 
following judgement: ‘[…] the State may also exercise its powers so as to take actions 
in a particular situation where it has been determined that the common good is served 
by giving benefits of residency to a category of foreign nationals – as a gift, in effect.’ 
Yet this speech-act event demonstrating the rights of the state and the absolute nature 
of sovereign power is quickly followed by Minister Ahern’s caveats: a list that runs 
from international conventions to EU Treaty rights, all of which serves to undermine 
the seemingly absolute power of the security, territory, population triumvirate. As far 
back as Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right it has been noted that sovereignty 
is not the foundation of modern state power but rather an effect of the particular 
relationship between state formation, civil society and ‘the people’ (Spinoza’s ‘the 
multitude’).8 Taking this seriously involves refusing the image of an axiomatic and 
absolute relationship between state-security, territory and population – a political 
‘ontopology’ whereby the present-being is stabilized in locality, rooted to ‘soil’ and 
thus configured bodily (Derrida 2005: 157; see also 1994).9  Instead, we wish to 
suggest that the assemblage of security, immigration and integration has required a 
particular (albeit localized) performance of the state and its sovereignty. The authority 
of the state is based on juridical authority; the state has it within its gift to grant rights 
and uphold the common good. The assumption, therefore, is that to study security, 
immigration and integration is to study the state. But this ontopology is embedded in a 
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 TH Marshall (1977) for example traces the modern form of citizenship to the moment in which 
absolute state power cedes to people’s rights to property, habeas corpus, due process, what Michel 
Foucault once (albeit hesitantly) termed the ‘democratization of sovereignty’ (Rose and Valverde 1998: 
541-551).  
9
 Ontopology for Derrida is the ‘axiomatic linking indissociably the ontological value of present-being 
[on] to its situation, to the stable and presentable determination of a locality, the topos of territory, 
native soil, city, body in general’ (Derrida 1994: 82). In this sense he may argue that all national 
memories of rootedness are rooted in memories of or anxieties over the displacement of population.  
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context of a vanishing Common Travel Area and the progressive up-loading of 
security, immigration and integration to EU competence. These speech-act events 
show in their performance a fragile, contested and eroding sovereignty. 
  
By briefly attending to this current legislation on immigration and residency, it 
becomes possible to discern two important lessons. Firstly, legislation on migration 
management renders immigration (and thus integration) as a matter of security. 
Secondly, and following Derrida’s understanding of ‘ontopology’, we may venture 
that to perform state power necessarily involves something excessive, almost. 
Regulating bodies by evoking the powerful triumvirate of state-security, territory and 
population paradoxically carries with it insecurity, and thus a certain metaphysical 
quality. The state thus configured cannot merely manage, regulate or govern 
population and territory, i.e. reveal the State to be nothing more than a form of 
governing.  The state must evoke something beyond; a soul, or spirit, perhaps? 
  
3. The Soul of Integration 
In his contribution to the 2006 McGill Summer School then Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform, Michael McDowell, TD describes the challenge of 
reconciling diversity and cohesion from the position of liberal republicanism. But 
what does he mean by cohesion? It is not simply a shared economic and social 
existence; rather, cohesion denotes ‘a sense of pride’, that you are ‘cheering for’ our 
society: 
 
So, while we live in a society and in a world in which there is huge mobility, 
we cannot simply throw out the notion of some form of necessary social 
cohesion. In some sense a spirit, or a soul, or a personality, or a shared 
minimum set of values is at the heart of society. We aren’t a monochrome 
society. We aren’t simply a Celtic, a Gaelic, or a Catholic society. […]  
 
But his vision of society composed of real sets of values and an always-already 
diverse ‘spirit’ is marked off as different from the values and spirit evident in other 
nation-states: 
 
You might believe, and I don’t, in the notion that there is a simple Irish soul, 
that there is a single definition of what it is to be an Irish citizen, that there is a 
single set of values which all Irish citizens must hold. If you hold this belief, 
then you may be attracted to the French approach to integration which is that 
your daughters will not wear a veil to school, your sons will not wear skull 
caps to school, you must learn French, you must learn to be a citizen of the 
French republic, you must effectively go under the yoke of French 
republicanism to participate in French society, and diversity will be frowned 
upon to the extent that it conflicts with those aims. […] We have in this 
country in the past accorded to the Protestant and Jewish faiths the right to 
organize their education as they see it. Whether that is wise or unwise is a 
matter for debate, but we cannot now withdraw that right from newer migrant 
groups into Irish society. I don’t think we can say that the drawbridge now 
comes up and that everyone must conform to a single form of state secular 
education in pursuit of social cohesion. I believe that the French approach is 
unnecessarily rigid. I believe that we can, by adopting a slightly less 
ideological approach in Ireland, allow for diversity. […] Integration is 
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essential at a certain level, but it cannot be pushed the whole way. (McDowell 
2006: 57-62 passim). 
 
It is easy – far too easy – to divide a statement such as this into its constituent 
elements and then seek to challenge the basis of each. Take for example the issue of 
diversity and education. Catholic ‘state’ schools (ninety three per cent of all primary 
schools in 2007) are the prevailing form of education provision in Ireland, and 
Catholic children are prioritized in enrolments. Indeed, the resulting potential for the 
exclusion of immigrant children is one of the bases for ongoing discussions on the 
future of Catholic patronage (see Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference 2007, 2008). 
Thus, a convincing argument can be made that the toleration of faith-based education 
in Ireland has little to do with either a historical respect for diversity or a 
contemporary concern for migrants’ rights and quite a lot to do with a denominational 
education system with a weak connection to res publica.10 The conclusion that one 
could easily reach by unpicking the claims made in this statement is that when it 
comes to nailing down Irish liberal republicanism’s position on diversity the facade 
crumbles. Each constituent element of this position is fungible. The statement looks 
the more tangible (‘ideological’) example of France in the hope that the mirror will 
show our preferred self-image. It sketches a diagram of social cohesion that runs from 
minimum values to sentimental loyalty and along the way stretches credibility beyond 
its threshold of elasticity. Then there are cherry-picked examples from Irish history, 
vigorously massaged to fit with an ideological position that refuses the label of 
ideology. And, holding all of these elements together, there is an underlying 
assumption that unlike our European neighbours Ireland has somehow found a 
formula by means of which to balance diversity and cohesion. One should conclude 
that others would do well to follow the Irish example – they, apparently, have too 
much integration. 
  
It is certainly striking that issues of social cohesion, nationalism and even racism are 
spoken of in terms of ‘culture’, values and tolerance. Rather than describing material 
and structural conditions, the former Minister speaks of the ‘heart’, ‘soul’ and 
‘personality’ of Ireland, a societal volk-geist described in elusive terms because it is 
always-already diverse – ‘We aren’t simply a Celtic, a Gaelic, or a Catholic society’ 
(2006: 57). The philosopher and psychoanalyst Slavoj Žižek asks an important 
question in this regard: Why are so many problems today perceived as problems of 
intolerance, rather than as problems of inequality, exploitation or injustice? Žižek 
concludes that a ‘culturalization of politics’ is occurring and is concerned to show the 
                                                
10
 It is also important to note that one of the facilitating conditions behind the former Minister for 
Justice’s statement is a belief that Ireland has escaped immigration and race-based politics evident in 
other Member States such as France. Moreover, Ireland, the former Minister claims, has escaped the 
racial street violence evident in other countries. Such a position can be challenged. Many 
commentators have argued that the lack of attention to far-right, race-based politics in Ireland may be a 
consequence of the lack of any grounds upon which any such political discourse could form – simply 
because those policy grounds are already occupied by political parties that configure themselves to be 
centrist. Moreover, while organized race-based street violence is uncommon in Ireland, as are reported 
instances of racially-motivated crime, one has to be very careful in what once classifies and counts. 
The recent EU-MIDIS report showed an entry for Ireland in the ‘top ten’ Member States in which 
minorities experienced discrimination: fifty four per cent of Sub-Saharan Africans surveyed reported 
experiencing discrimination in a twelve-month period (n = 503). Sub-Saharan Africans also reported 
very high levels of experiences of ‘racially motivated’ crime and harassment, together with high levels 
of ‘policing’ and low levels of trust in the authorities – two thirds of those who claimed to have 
experienced ‘racially motivated’ crime and/or harassment did not report these offences. 
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ways in which political differences are naturalized, placed in the realm of inveterate, 
set in their ways-of-life identities and, thus, become matters of toleration rather than 
emancipation or struggle. Liberalism, in this sense, tolerates cultural differences as 
long as they are largely confined to the private realm and secondary to minimum sets 
of values – values assumed to be good and true for all but nonetheless built on the 
values of some. This is ethnocentrism, but a form of ethnocentrism justified on the 
basis that our ethno is a good one to have at the centre, and given a boost by the 
scripting of contemporary imperialisms as solely for the cause of liberal deliverance 
(Seymour 2008).  
 
But Žižek is also careful to note that this ‘culturalization’ cannot be understood as the 
fashionable outward appearance of underlying processes, be it nationalism or racism. 
There is no such thing as mere appearances. Therefore, to frame Michael McDowell’s 
contribution to the McGill Summer School as a culturalist and pseudo-philosophical 
veil behind which is the ugly face of racism and exclusion is to miss the point. Politics 
(even culturalized politics) is not a form, appearance or illusionary expression of 
some more actual or real processes. As Clifford Geertz once put it: 
 
There is, there can be, no backstage where we can go to catch a glimpse of […] 
actors as “real persons” lounging about in street clothes, disengaged from their 
profession, displaying with artless candour their spontaneous desires and 
unprompted passions. They may change their roles, their styles of acting, even 
the dramas in which they play; but — as Shakespeare himself of course 
remarked—they are always performing. (Geertz 1966: 3) 
  
The interesting invitation, therefore, in considering Irish liberal republicanism’s 
position on diversity is to actually take it seriously, to not push against the facade but 
rather study its appearance.  
  
In ‘Strangers in Their Own Country’ (2001), a thoughtful essay written at the 
highpoint of both Ireland’s economic boom and net inward migration, Declan Kiberd 
explores issues of racism, multiculturalism and social change in Ireland. The essay 
makes use of examples ranging from identity politics in the United States to English 
football hooliganism to help think about the tension between the ‘culture’ of the 
nation-state and the stranger. The essay asks a simple question: is a liberal form of 
multiculturalism possible, whereby both national culture and minority difference may 
be respected? His answer, which shares more than a family resemblance to Michael 
McDowell’s contribution to the McGill Summer School a few years later, is that there 
is nothing inherently wrong with a national culture that enshrines a set of codes within 
the nation-state, and this should not necessarily take from the possibility of an 
inclusive multiculturalism.   
 
How does an eminent literary scholar imagine reconciling diversity and cohesion? 
Instead of a semantic cluster of magical volk-speak composed of the ‘heart’, ‘soul’, 
‘spirit’ or even the ‘personality’ of Ireland, Kiberd discussed the possible ways in 
which Irish national self-identity might be opened up to better deal with the category 
of the stranger or foreigner. Of course, his sources are literary, especially those artists 
whose creativity springs from and speaks to the tensions between the particular and 
the universal, the national gemeinschaft and the author in cosmopolitan gesellschaft. 
For example, ‘Joyce was one of the first artists […] to imagine a “world without 
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foreigners”, a world possible once men and women began to accept the foreigner in 
the self and the necessarily fictive nature of all nationalisms […]’ (Kiberd 2001: 64). 
In this line of thought there can be no essentially Irish culture, defined narrowly, into 
which the foreigner must integrate. To recognize the diversity within one’s national 
culture is at core an act of toleration, because ‘those who lack a sophisticated sense of 
their own origins are more likely to seek a simplified version of the past, in whose 
name to lash out at the foreign’ (Kiberd 2001: 65).  But what of the potential flash-
points when cohesion and diversity square off (these then to be hypothetical or just 
rare and repeated as one might a rumour)? Kiberd argues that the ‘right to practice 
one’s own culture in public should go very deep, but it can never be absolute in cases 
where it may override the rights of others’ (Kiberd 2001: 70). 
   
It is unlikely that Declan Kiberd and the former Minister would find much in common 
if trapped in an elevator, but standing back from their positions one is struck by the 
similarity of their problematization of the issues, and the language tools used by each 
to address this problematization. Their discussions appear to be the same – and 
appearances matter. The perceived problem of migration is the balancing of ethnicity, 
minority rights and diversity, on one side, with national culture, shared values, and 
cohesion on the other side. If the balance is not achieved then the diversity of 
immigrants might well become the hard-shelled difference of so-called ‘parallel 
communities’; or, perhaps worse still, recognition of the internal diversity of national 
culture might fade into a rigid sense of our essential culture – something to be 
defended. Therefore, in order to accommodate their diversity we must recognize our 
own diversity. However, our historical diversity includes the instantiation of liberal 
values that are at the core of our capacity to recognize the diversity of others. 
Therefore, what is at stake for us is an engagement with our liberal values of 
toleration, liberal values that allow us to tolerate them, minimum sets of liberal values 
that must be shared by all because they are the real borderline between us and them.  
   
Around the world one sees versions of this reductive problematization spoken of in 
local accents. For example, Declan Kiberd draws on the work of the US historian 
Arthur Schlesinger Jr. to support his argument that the alternative to supporting 
national culture is a fraying of the integrity of the nation-state into pockets of diversity, 
minority politics and, ultimately, ‘the cult of ethnicity,’ where suddenly everyone is a 
member of a minority and is demanding respect for their ‘culture’ (Schlesinger 1991: 
20). This is the basis of Schlesinger’s argument for a reinvigorated common national 
culture, a reassertion of the USA as American. But Schlesinger also asserts that the 
freedom to practice one’s cultural traditions and beliefs — the basis for this entire 
debate — is a value of western civilisation, and ‘our’ civilisation should not have 
‘guilt trips laid on it by champions of cultures based on despotism, superstition, 
tribalism, and fanaticism [,… Africans] who show themselves either incapable of 
operating democracy or ideologically hostile to the democratic idea’ (Schlesinger 
1991: 133-134). Here, again, we are encouraged to tolerate our own ethnocentrism, 
because our ethno is a good one to have at the centre. Western civilisation is identified 
as the well-spring of democracy, liberalism, tolerance11, even multiculturalism.  
                                                
11
 Kiberd also draws on the example of France and the philosophical insights of Julia Kristeva. 
Towards the end of Etrangers à nous-mémes Kristeva asks: ‘How could one tolerate a foreigner if one 
did not know one was a stranger to oneself? And to think it has taken such a long time for that small 
truth’ (1991: 182). The liberal hope is that in a world where everyone recognises their essential 
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An (other) Introduction 
Global demographics and international migration are increasingly problematized as 
matters of security. Global inequalities, the ease and potential speed of population 
movements, coupled with the rise of xenophobia and atavistic nationalism, have 
proven to be fertile ground for alarmist speculation. Most famously, in the early 1990s 
historians Matthew Connelly and Paul Kennedy predicted, ‘the rich will have to fight 
and the poor will have to die if mass migration is not to overwhelm us all’ (1994: 61). 
Connelly and Kennedy’s apocalyptic vision may be extreme, but it is certainly the 
case that migration is widely understood to present a ‘crisis’ to first-world security 
and to social and national integrity. In the recent FORESEC Report on European 
Security a complex policy matrix is provided to illustrate the interconnections 
between the key trends, drivers and threats facing Europe (Langton 2009: 61, figure 
5). In the diagram, urbanization and population growth interact with terrorism, crime, 
trafficking and the medical bio-security risks emanating from the so-called third 
world. In this diagram the issue of reconciling diversity and social cohesion is a 
matter of security, and thus integration is held together with other threats in an 
assemblage. The EU, we are told,  
 
[…] is regarded as a destination for migrants because of its perceived liberal 
border regime, economic benefits including healthcare, and the promise of a 
safer and more prosperous future for many people. For traffickers and 
criminals of many types Europe is the location of choice because of the 
“market” opportunities it offers. […]  Illegal migrants are often the chosen 
facilitator of the criminal and non-state world, once again highlighting the 
increased need to control borders at a time when globalization and the 
liberalization of trade regimes challenges the idea, and the European Union 
interior (Schengen) is virtually free of border controls. […] However, rather 
than being transnational in character, responses remain based largely on 
national policies which react to the demands of domestic labour markets, post-
colonial agreements, and national security concerns rather than recognising the 
transnational, even global, nature of the problem. (Langton 2009: 54-64 
passim) 
 
We began this essay with an epigraph from Franco Frattini, European Commissioner 
responsible for Justice, Freedom and Security. The epigraph is taken from his address 
to the High-level Conference on Legal Immigration held in Lisbon in 2007 in which 
he sets out many of the same challenges identified in numerous security reports. The 
                                                                                                                                       
foreignness there will be no strangers and tolerance of diversity will be made possible. Kristeva sets out 
her position in plain terms in an interview: 
 
One has never seen such numbers of Arabs and blacks in France. These populations, these 
new immigrants, are very different from Italian, Spanish, or Polish populations of the thirties 
or fifties, which wanted to integrate themselves and become French. At that time, there was a 
very positive image of France, connected with the French revolution, such that one might say, 
‘Yes, I am Polish, but my children shall become ministers of France’ […]  
 There is a tendency to reject, in the name of cultural pluralism, the good aspects of a 
tradition. […] If you go about saying, ‘Destroy France. Take down the statues of Joan of Arc.  
No more champagne or foie gras,’ then you only further the sense of others that their identity 
is being menaced. (1993: 175-176 passim) 
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EU will continue to need immigration, but the right kind of immigration; the 
challenge is to facilitate the right kinds of mobility, while controlling that same 
mobility in such a way as to reduce risk and insecurity. On the issue of developing a 
comprehensive integration policy for Europe, Frattini is clear: the integration of legal 
immigrants and the securitization of Europe’s borders are ‘two sides of the same coin’ 
(Frattini 2007: 5). In this complex assemblage of integration, immigration and 
security, the furtherance of securitization is assured, and ‘there is no migration 
without integration’ (ibid. [original emphasis]). Accordingly, Europe faces the 
challenges of managing the integration of immigrants and their diversity, but can meet 
these challenges by falling back on Europe's founding values and principles – ‘our 
fundamental roots, the principles we inherited from our Founding Fathers’ (ibid.). 
What we have here is ontopology, the axiomatic rooting of present-being bodily to 
territory or native soil (Derrida 1994: 82). In Derrida’s sense ontopology is 
paradoxically rooted in insecurity and thus is excessive and suggests a metaphysical 
quality. 
  
In Ireland many of the debates about migration to date have been focused on 
responses to state policy. At this conjuncture, and through an attention to assemblage, 
more work is required now concerning the lack of availability of a secure analytical 
category called ‘the state’, especially when one looks to the long history of the 
Common Travel Area and the progressive up-loading of competence in migration and 
integration policy to Europe. But the performance of state as speech act events in 
Ireland is one matter. What is most striking is the availability of oddly similar events 
with equally metaphysical qualities elsewhere – France, the USA, and in many other 
countries. It is necessary now to emphasis open and fluid research frames on the 
topics of integration, immigration and security, and to approach with skepticism 
debates solely transfixed by the magic of the nation-state. 
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